High-Impact Risks to the Electric Grid & Other Critical Infrastructures Some human-caused threats might utilize a natural disaster to mask and extend infrastructure damage.

A severe solar storm caused by an Earth-directed coronal mass ejection (CME).

An EMP caused by a coordinated attack using radio frequency weapons and.

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by detonation of one or more nuclear warheads in the upper atmosphere over the United States.

Cyberattacks against industrial control systems and/or other cyber-enabled technology.

George Baker developed and others helped refine an important matrix of impacts from five threats to the grid and other key infrastructures. This article examines the national power grid and the most significant threats to it. Imperfect plans, thoughtfully developed, are far better than no plan at all. Although there may be unforeseeable points of failure, cascading effects, and barriers to recovery, plans can still be made for prevention, mitigation, adaptation, and recovery. Thus, nations that develop resilience and recovery plans for long-term, wide-area electric power blackouts are in uncharted territory. The recently published InfraGard community preparedness guide, Powering Through: From Fragile Infrastructures to Community Resilience (hereafter Powering Through), states that no post-industrial society has yet experienced a widespread and prolonged electric blackout.

Government, including public works, law enforcement, and emergency services.

Fuel extraction, refining, and distribution.

Water supply and wastewater treatments.If electric power were not available for weeks, months, or even a year, then cascading impacts would degrade multiple critical infrastructures, for example: Consequently, it is vital that citizens, households, communities, businesses, and governments be as informed and prepared as possible.Ĭitizens of the United States are dependent on secure and reliable electric power for their current way of life. Without electric power, the goods and services essential to protect life and property would be at risk by day three or perhaps longer depending on preparedness levels. As such, effective recovery cannot be expected through top-down assistance alone. This bleak outlook results from understanding that so many critical infrastructures depend on electricity. If there were a prolonged nationwide, multi-week or multi-month power failure, neither the federal government nor any state, local, tribal, or territorial government – acting alone or in concert – would be able to execute an effective response. Baker & Stephen Volandt Wed, May 09, 2018

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